What happens if we make the GST tax switch?

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Debate has returned on the benefits of switching the GST-income tax mix. While there are efficiency and resilience gains to be made, there will be transitional costs.

GST has been in the media again in recent weeks, with calls to increase and broaden the GST while cutting income tax rates to compensate (e.g. from Josh Frydenberg and the Grattan Institute).

At face value such a tax-mix switch may seem to be radical – fundamentally altering the way Australians pay tax. Furthermore, if low-income earners tend to spend relatively more of their income, then the GST will tax them at higher rates than an income tax would – which seems unfair.

Both concerns can be mitigated as part of a reform program. To work out a reform that does so, we need to understand how GST and income taxes impact people differently.

In the long-term a GST is just a better income tax

A broad-based tax (like income tax and GST) compels individuals to sacrifice some consumption so that the funds can be used to pay for government services.

The current income tax does this unevenly due to gaps in what can be collected for administrative and political reasons.

Importantly, comprehensive income taxes overtax savings. Some savings income is compensation for delaying when to spend (what is known as the ‘normal rate of return’). Taxing this income implies that if you save now and consume in the future that spending is taxed twice. The highly regarded Mirrlees Review of the UK tax system (2011) recommended this should be removed from the tax system by including a rate-of-return allowance for capital income.

The GST cuts out the middleman by taxing consumption directly – making the system administratively simpler, removing gaps in what is taxed (the ‘tax base’), and no longer double-taxing the decision to save.

There are other advantages to such a switch. A destination-based tax – such as the GST – will be more resilient to future economic changes due to AI and other technological change.

Equity tells us to broaden the GST

While GST reform sounds nice in theory, there are genuine concerns about whether raising the rate and broadening the base would be equitable.

Research from the UNSW-e61 partnership sheds light on the equity of current GST arrangements. It separates these concerns into 2 types. The first is vertical inequity, which reflects a view that tax rates will decline as people’s resources rise (regressivity). The second is horizontal inequity, which reflects concerns around differences in tax rates among those with similar resources.

The regressivity of the GST is overstated if we just compare current income to current GST paid; individuals who save now tend to do so because they will earn less in the future. What we really want to know is how tax paid compares with persistent, or lifetime, income.

Chart 1

The GST remains mildly regressive when looking at persistent income, but this simply reflects that high-income individuals bequeath proportionally larger inheritances. Since these inheritances will face GST when they are consumed, they will still be subject to tax.

For this reason, the value of tax ultimately paid will be the same irrespective of whether you are taxed on your wages or if you are taxed on the goods and services you buy. This makes swapping taxes on wages with taxes on consumption a proportional tax change.

Even if the GST is a proportional tax, the change in the tax mix can still end up being regressive – as the GST no longer taxes the normal rate of return on capital income, and high-income earners save proportionally more.

But double-taxing the spending of savers is a poorly targeted means for increasing progressivity. There are many individuals with low lifetime income who save substantially for their retirement. Redistribution could be more efficiently achieved by making the income tax scale slightly more progressive alongside any tax-mix switch.

The challenge with cutting income tax rates is that it is not possible to reduce the tax rate for the income tax-free threshold. For this reason, an increase in progressivity could be achieved through a regular unconditional payment to households that creates negative effective tax rates at low levels of income. Similar proposals have been made in Australia and implemented overseas.

Horizontal inequity in the GST – the principle of ensuring common tax treatment for people with similar income and consumption – is a different issue. Here, the inequity arises from the gaps in the GST base and the income tax base. Switching from an income to consumption tax would swap one horizontal inequality with another. Broadening the GST base would more directly reduce this inequity. And it is also likely to make the GST a more efficient tax.

Chart 2

The real action is in the transition

Even if a tax-mix switch makes sense in the long term, it has transitional effects that could be substantial.

One such effect is that the tax-mix switch operates like a one-off tax on wealth. While a higher labour income tax and a higher GST will create the same tax liability over someone’s lifetime, switching from one to the other part way through people’s lives will not.

This is because consumption and income occur at different points in life. You tend to borrow when young, save in your peak earning years, and run down savings when you retire. Someone who has already earned most of their lifetime income but still has a lot of their lifetime consumption ahead of them (e.g. someone near retirement) will have paid income tax on their earnings and will then pay the higher GST when they spend them.

Chart 3

Imagine an extreme scenario where a person pays a 20 per cent tax rate on their labour earnings, and this is then switched to a 25 per cent tax rate on their spending. Over a lifetime they would pay the same tax under either system. However, if the person starts in the income tax system and transitions to the consumption tax system part way through their life they will pay additional tax.

If the change occurs when the person is 65, the switch will increase their lifetime tax liability by over $93,000 or 22 per cent (this assumes the individual follows a standard earnings profile but saves and borrows so they can spend the same amount each year).

Chart 4

Such a wealth transfer from older Australians to younger Australians may be popular in some quarters but a dealbreaker with others. Either way, it is significant and needs to be recognised, as it was when GST was introduced in 2000.

Beyond this it is likely that other payments and policies within the fiscal system will need to be adjusted if the effective GST rate is increased. Some of these are obvious (e.g. a CPI adjustment for benefit payments) while others are less talked about (e.g. adjustments to APRA’s serviceability assumptions).

What these insights mean for policy design

Overall, this suggests that a GST-income tax switch would improve the efficiency of the Australian tax system. However, there are 3 key lessons about what is necessary for good reform:

  1. Broadening the GST base is a necessary part of an effective GST-income tax switch.

  2. A tax-mix switch that increases the rate of GST will, on average, act as a transfer from older to younger Australians.

  3. The full implications of a GST change depend on the other tax and transfer system changes that are included with it, specifically adjustments to the corporate tax, the income tax scale, and transfer payments.

Adding to the complexity of this proposal for change is the GST distribution to states. At present, a GST-income tax switch would have political and fiscal costs for the federal government while transferring revenue to state governments. As e61 CEO Michael Brennan has outlined, it is an open question whether we should break the nexus between revenue assistance to states and GST collected – a link that was a product of past political expediency, and now arguably stands in the way of necessary tax reform.

This paper uses unit record data from Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey [HILDA] conducted by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Australian Government, DSS, or any of DSS’ contractors or partners. DOI: 10.26193/GMYVPW.


Josh Clyne
Josh Clyne

Josh Clyne is a Pre-doctorate Economist at the e61 Institute. His research primarily explores the design of the tax and transfer system. Prior to joining e61, Josh completed a Masters in Economics from the University of Copenhagen and he completed his Bachelor Studies at the University of Melbourne.

Matt Nolan
Matt Nolan

Matt is a Senior Research Manager at the e61 Institute. His research is focused on analysing income distributions using microdata, with a focus on how taxes, transfers, and changes in labour market settings influence the distribution of income. Matt previously worked at the Inland Revenue Department of New Zealand and as a teaching fellow at Victoria University of Wellington. He holds a PhD in Philosophy (Economics) from Victoria University of Wellington.