What can Bazball teach us about policy evaluation?

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England’s poor Ashes performance this summer highlights how hard it is to evaluate policy change.

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It took 5,468 days, but the England men’s cricket team has finally won another Test in Australia. Yet, they still enter Sunday’s final Test down 3-1. This result has surprised many pundits who expected England to do much better, following the much hyped approach of “Bazball”.

So why have England been so disappointing this summer, and what can this teach us about how we evaluate policy interventions? 

Bazball began in May 2022, when Brendan “Baz” McCullum was appointed the England coach. Almost immediately the team adopted a radically more aggressive style of play and results improved sharply. Comparing the 18 months before and after McCullum’s appointment, England’s win rate jumped by 52 percentage points. Players, pundits, and fans credited a cultural and tactical revolution. Collins Dictionary named Bazball one of its words of 2023.

So what went wrong, why didn’t Bazball work this time around?

To economists this story is familiar. McCullum’s appointment is in many ways just another policy intervention – much like a tax reform or regulatory change. And as with other policy interventions, the temptation following the introduction of Bazball was for pundits and the public to conclude that because outcomes improved dramatically, it must have been because of Bazball. Case closed.

Except it rarely is.

The Bazball episode illustrates two common mistakes that occur in both sport and policy analysis which can lead to surprises such as England’s disappointing 2025/26 Ashes series.

The first mistake is attributing the entire change in observed outcomes to the effect of the policy.

When outcomes improve after a new strategy or policy is introduced, it is tempting to attribute the entire improvement to the intervention. But outcomes almost never move for a single reason. In cricket, opposition quality varies, playing conditions change and luck matters. Failing to account for these factors can overstate the true effect of a policy and ultimately lead to disappointment when the mismeasurement is revealed.

There were at least two factors that changed at around the time Bazball was introduced that inflated its apparent effect.

The first was English pitch conditions. Recent Test series in England have been played on flatter, more batting friendly pitches. In Tests played in England this decade, the average runs scored by their batsmen increased from 32 to 39 following the introduction of Bazball. However, the averages of England’s bowlers (runs conceded per wicket) increased too, reflecting the easier batting conditions.

Pundits largely focused on the increase in England’s batting averages, concluding that Bazball had unlocked England’s hidden batting talent. But controlling for pitch conditions – by looking at the difference between English batting and bowling averages – suggests 41 per cent (2.8 runs) of the uplift in English batting averages in England was attributable to these changing conditions.

The second factor that changed was the quality of England’s opponents. The pre Bazball period included tours to Australia and India (shown by the red dots below), the toughest environments for English players. The immediate post period did not.

As these more difficult series have returned to the fixture list, England’s performance has declined. Indeed, when we compare results holding the type of series constant, it appears that much of England’s improvement is driven by their performances in these ‘easier’ series immediately following Bazball’s introduction.

Finally, England were performing unusually poorly just before McCullum’s appointment, so some of the subsequent improvement may well reflect mean reversion, rather than a structural change in their underlying quality.

The second mistake analysts make is conflating short run effects with long run ones.

The initial effect of a policy often partially reflects its novelty and ability to take advantage of factors which cannot change in the short run. When these factors change – when opponents adapt – short run effects can fade.

Evidence suggests that the effects of Bazball had already begun to diminish before this summer’s Ashes series. England’s advantage over their opponents – their batting average minus their bowling average – had fallen from around 9 runs in 2023, to only 1 run in 2025.

Bazball’s fade out overtime holds an important lesson for economic policy makers and researchers. Many empirical studies in economics compare outcomes just before and after a policy change using methods such as difference in differences or regression discontinuity. These methods are valuable, but they often capture transitional dynamics rather than long run responses.

A recent paper by researchers at the University of Chicago makes this point in the context of minimum wage increases. While many previous short run empirical estimates had found little to no employment effect, they argue that long run effects can look very different because firms have time to adjust by relocating, automating, or changing production methods.

The broader lesson from this and the Bazball story is not that data driven analysis is not useful, but that it must be disciplined. Conventional wisdom and theory shouldn’t be thrown out just because the data says something unexpected.

Cricket and policy analysis share an uncomfortable similarity. Outcomes are noisy, stories are seductive, and it is easy to mistake correlation for causation. Credible policy evaluation requires counterfactuals, attention to timing, and a clear theory of adjustment.

In cricket, misreading the evidence may only mean an unexpected Ashes defeat and a disappointed Barmy Army. But in public policy, it could mean abandoning an effective reform too early, persisting with an ineffective one for too long, or designing future policy around flawed lessons from the past.

e61_Institute-Aditya_Maitra

Adit Maitra

Adit is a Pre-Doctorate economist at the e61 institute. His research focuses on topics related to competition in the Australian economy and consumer finance. Adit graduated from the University of Melbourne with First Class Honours and the University Medal in Economics and a Mathematics Degree.

Matthew Maltman

Matthew Maltman is a Senior Research Economist at the e61 institute. He specialises in applied microeconomics, with research spanning tax-transfer policy, labour markets, gambling, and productivity. His published academic work has examined the effects of zoning reform on housing supply and rents. Prior to joining e61, Matt worked at the Australian Productivity Commission and holds a First-Class Honours degree in Economics from the University of Western Australia.